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I have been asked to speak on the general topic of the changing nature 
of the US-European relations, and in doing that I would like to focus my re-
marks more specificaIIy on US policy towards Europe and US perspectives 
on Europe. 
I would do this for (wo reasons. First of alI because I feel that the 
United States will continue to have an important impact on European secu-
rity. This is a view that many people, not just in the United States, but in 
Europe, would subscribe to. 
Second I would like to foeus on US policy and US views because 
I feel, having travelled about in Europe a fair amount, that American 
attitudes are not fully understood in many parts of Europe, and I would 
like to try to give you at least my assessment of how those views are 
evolving. 
What I would like to try to do more specifically is to identify areas 
of continuity and areas of change in US foreign policy, and in doing that 
I would like to focus on !wo imporlant transitions. The first is the end 
of lhe cold war and lhe second is the end of the Bush administration, 
ar to put it in another way, lhe arrival of the Bill and Hillary Clinton 
administration in Washington. 
My main argument is that I think there will be a great deal of con-
tinuity in US policy towards Europe with the arrival of the Clinton adminis-
tration and I feeI that this is true for a couple of reasons. I guess the 
most important of those is that I believe there is a very strong con-
sensus in the United Stales about what US national interest are, what 
the US role in world affairs should be. I would argue that consensus has 
existed for aproximately fifty years, since the earIy day of the WorId War II. 
I believe that tbis consensus has survived the end of the cold war, and 
I believe that this consensus will still be in place now that we have a 
new administration in Washington. Indeed, in Bill Clinton's first press 
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conference after winning the presidency in November last yoar, he went 
out of rus way to emphasize that America's fundamental interests have 
not changed. 
Let me just take a few moments now to explain what I feel thosc 
interests are. The first American national interest I think is relatively 
simple and straight forward, and that is to make sure that the United 
States does not come under direct military attack. 
The second interest is to make sure that indirect threats to American 
security not develop in Europe or Asia. And Ihere are a couple of poten-
tial problems there that American foreign policy makers keep in mind. One 
potential problem is the possibility of one country trying to establish a 
dominance in Europe or Asia, and we have very strong interest in making 
sure that does not come to pass; indeed, the was the conceptual founda· 
tion of America's containment policy which was the guiding American 
foreign policy for over forty years from the end of the 1940's until the end 
of the cold war, just a couple of years ago. The United States also has an 
important national interest in making sure that a war between and among 
the great powers in Europe or East Asia does not take place. If such a 
war did take place, the winner of that war might find himself in a dominanl 
position which would be contrary to American interests. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the United States could become invol-
ved in such a war wruch would not be in US or American interests. Twice 
in this century already the Urtited States has been drawn into European 
and Asian wars; it is not inconceivable that that could happen again in 
the fulure. So, in these respects, I think you can see how Europe plays a 
very important role in Ameriean thinking about potential tllreats that 
could affect American national security. 
Now, there is a third national inlerest that the United States has, 
that also I think directly relates to US/European relations, and the third 
general interest is to promole American economic prosperity. You can see 
I am putting things in a very narrow American perspective, beeause when 
Americans look at American nalional inlerests these are the kind of things 
they have to keep in mind. Developments in Europe, again, will affeet 
Ameriean economic prosperity. It is important, from America's perspective, 
that things slay peaeeful in Wcstern Europe. in particular, because if 
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countries in Western Europe and East Asia go to war, American economic 
prosperity will suffer, even if the United St.tes does not become involved 
militarily in the war. 
It is also widely believed in the United States that it is imperative 
th.t international order be maintained. It is widely believed in the United 
St.tes, contrary to the impression you might get if you pay too much 
attention to the protectionists, who sometimes get a great deal of .ttention 
in the media that the free movement of goods, services and capital is some-
thing that is very much in the US interest. 
ln the United States people also believe that there are instrumental 
objectives that the United States should try to pursue. One of those is the 
promotion of democracy. Democracy, if you look at it from a narrow national 
security perspective, is an instrumental objective because democracies are 
less likely to try to establish dominance over their neighbours and they 
are less likely to succumb to very intense nationalism. They are also just 
less likeIy to go to war with each other, and alI of these things are good 
from America's standpoint. 
The United States also has an interest in trying to promote market 
economies, because countries that develop market economic systems become 
heavily interdependent or intercOlmected with other econornies in the worId, 
are less likely to go to war with each other: the economic costs of going 
to war are simply too high. 
And so, for alI of these re.sons, the United States has a deep and 
abiding interest in what goes on in Europe. What goes on in Europe wiII 
affect America's security and American economic weIl being in a variety 
of ways, and this is why the United States has a very deep national inte-
rest in being involved in European aHairs in general, and European secu-
rity in particular. This is why the United States is very interested in main-
taining a military presence in Europe to help keep the peace and promote 
stability in the European continent. 
Now, as [ said there is a very strong consensus in the United States, 
il1 my opinion, about these interests in general, but in particular how 
they relate to Europe. I believe lhat there is a very strong consensus in 
the Clinton administration, that the United States has continuing good 
reasons for being involved in European affairs and doing whatever it 
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can to promote security and stability in Westem Europe and Europe as 
a whole. 
That said, there are important changes taking place in American 
foreign and defense policy, specifically as they relate to Europe. And the 
main reason that changes are taking place in American foreign policy is 
simply because the world has changed in fundamental ways in the course 
of the past three to four years. Although American interests have not 
changed, the threats to those interests have changed, with the withdrawal 
of Soviet power from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsow Pact, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in the end of the cold war; the 
threats to American security and to Western European security have chan· 
ged in important ways. No longer, in the United States, do policy makers 
stay up late at night loosing sleep over the possibility of a ditect Soviet 
attack taking place on Westem Europe. For several decades the most 
likely scenario that could have led to direct conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was a conventional war in Westem Europe 
breaking out, that could have led to a nuclear a!tack or a nuclear exchange 
between Washington and Moscow. That possibility is virtually non-exis-
tant, at least at the present time. lnstead, we now worry about maintai-
ning proper command and control over nuclear forces in the former Soviet 
Union. It is possible that renegade units of one kind or another could 
use nuclear forces perhaps even against the United States. Those who 
worry about ditect military threats to the United States also now worry a 
great deal more about proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missiles in the developing world. 
As far as indirect threats to American security are concemed, no 
one worries about the Soviet Union trying to establish a hegemony over 
Europe. No one worries about Russia now, trying to establish a hegemony 
over Westem Europe. It is an unlikely possibility, at least at tlus stage. 
lnstead, people in Washington and in Western European capitais worry 
about instability in Europe, possibly leading to inter-state warfare which 
in tum could lead to great powers in Westem Europe or the United States 
to become involved in these conflicts. 
So the threats to American security interests in Europe have changed 
and as a result, American foreign and defense policy is changing in impor-
tant ways. lnstead of having a confrontational relationship with Moscow, 
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people in Washington are now very interested in trying to develop a coopera-
tive security relationship with Moscow. It is widely recognized that we 
have common security interest with Moscow, that relate most speeifically 
to trying to reduce the size and instabilities assoeiated with our nuclear 
arsenais. Even in the United Nations, where they have started to develop 
more cooperative relationship with Moscow, and that was reflected most 
notably in Moscow support by and large for the American led efforts to 
deal with the conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
We have also seen dramatic changes in how the United States has 
gane about configuring its military forces and how it has dealt with 
Moscow on forces structure issues. As far as nuclear forces are concemed, 
for example, the United States and the republics of the former Soviet 
Union have entered into a variety of agreements in the past eighteen months ar 
soo If these agreements are fully implemented in the next couple of years, 
the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union will reduce 
their combined nuclear arsenais from a grand total of 47000 nuclear 
weapons to around 13000 nuclear weapons, reductions of over 70%, 
a reduction which is totally unprecedented in the history of nuclear arms 
contrai efforts. 13 000 nuclear weapons is still an awful lot of nuclear 
weapons, but substantial progress has been made, progress that would 
have been inconceivable during the most tense periods of the cold war. 
By the sarne token the United States and Moscow are in the process 
of trying to reduce their conventional forces - in some respects tbis is 
being dane through the formulas that were put into place in the CFE 
treaty - but the two sides are also reducing their conventional forces unilate-
rally. And the United States, for example, the Bush administration planned 
to reduce the size of the US military force structure from 2.1 million 
soldiers to 1.6 million soldiers; also planned to reduce the number of American 
troops deployed in Western Europe fram 325 000 to 150000; and also made 
plans to reduce American defense spending. ln fact, the US defense budget 
has been shrinking in real terms every year since the mid-1980's. The 
Bush administration expected that by 1997 the US defense hudget would 
have shrunk by one third in real terms compared to what it was in the 
mid-1980's at the height of the Reagan administration's defense build up. 
So you can see that American defense policy in particular is chan-
ging in important ways, ways that are very tangible, but American foreign 
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policy in general is changing in lhat wc are now trying to develop more 
cooperative relationship with Moscow in particular. I would argue lhal 
all of lhese changes are very important. It is important to keep in mind 
that they precede the arrival of the Clinton administration in Washington 
DC. These developments, as I have suggested earlier, can be lraced to 
developments that took place in the intel'national scene in the 1989 to 
1991 period. These development preceded the arrival of the Clinton 
adrninistration. 
Now, I believe that Bill Clinton and his advisors support these 
general policy direetions, and that is why I do not think lhere will be any 
radical change in Ameriean policy towards Europe. That said, the Clinton 
administration undoubtedly will shape American policy in some respeets. 
And with that I would like to tum to some areas where we can expect 
to see some changes in Ameriean policy towards Europe. One general 
change that I am sure you are all aware of is that this President, unlike 
the last one, will devote most of his time and energy to the many domestic 
problems Ihat lhe United States faces. Bill Clinton, throughout lhe course 
Df the campaign in 1992 emphasized that he would try to address the 
social problems, and more speeifically the eeonomie problems that the 
United States faces; indeed, in the campaign, he promised the American 
people lhat he would focus like a laser beam on the economy in the first 
months and years of his administration. 
I think this will inevitably aHect both policy formulation and policy 
implementation in Washington. /t will aHeet poliey formulation because 
ir the President devotes most of his time and energy to domestic issues. 
ii simply means that he is not going to have as much time to devote to 
roreign policy issues. That means that more responsibility and more deeisions 
will be made by his advisores. I think this focus wiII aHeet policy imple-
mentation primarily beeause as Bill Clinton and his advisors try to spend 
more money to correct America's domestio problems, it wiII quite simply 
have less money to devote to foreign assistance programs of various kinds. 
There wiII not be much money to devote to some of the foreign problems 
that Clinton would Iike to address. 
Now with than I would like to tum to what I see as the main items 
on Bill Clinton's foreign policy and defense policy agenda, with respect 
to Europe, and I would divide these problems into three broad categories. 
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The first calegory of problems are those Ihat are both urgent anel 
imporlant. The second calegory of problems are urgenl bul somewhat 
less imporlanl, aI leasl fram lhe slandpoinl of American nalional securily 
inleresls. And lhe Ihird calegory of problems are issues thal I would 
argue are bolh less urgent and less imporlant. 
LeI me slarl wilh lhe firsl calegory: Issues Ihal are urgent and impor-
tant. The firsl issue in Ihis calegory is lhe whole baskel of economie 
issues. During lhe campaign, Bill Clinlon, as I noted, slressed Ihal he 
would pul a great deal of emphasis on lrying to improve lhe performance 
of the American economy. I believe thal Bill Clinlon's number one foreign 
policy objective, and Ihis is somethillg that he and his advisors have Ihemsel-
ves stressed, is to restare America's economic competitiveness abroad. 
I lhink this is their top priority. They wanl lo raise exporls, and Ihey 
wanl lo reduce lhe balance of Irade deficil Ihal is very high and has been 
very high for some lime. 
Bi! Clinlon and his advisors recognize that the sources of Ameri-
ea's eeonomie problems are complex, Ihere is certainly a wide variety 
of domeslic sourees, and Clinton and his advisors will spend a great 
deal of lime trying to address the domeslic roots of America's eeonomie 
problems. But Ihey also believe, and I Ihink this is a view Ihat is widely 
shared in lhe foreign policy eommunity in Washington, they also believe 
lha I America's eeonomie problems have international sourees, more specifi· 
eally, Ihey believe thal some eountries in the internationaI eeonomie sys· 
tem in Weslern Europe and East Asia are engaged in unfair trading pracli-
ces, and they make it very diffjcult for the United States lo export ils 
goods, and lhey make it very difficult for the United States lo elose its 
balance of trade deficit. During lhe eampaign Bill Clinton said that he 
would «take sleps to make sure that countries open the doors of their 
eeonomie houses» otherwise he felt partnerships would be in danger. 
Now, even if we discount some of his campaign rhetodc as being 
campaign rhetoric, I think it is very elear that Bill Clinton will push very 
hard on this economie agenda. Indeed, we have already secn signs in just 
the first four weeks of lhe Clinton administration - and today is the 4th 
week anniversary of lhe Clinton administration - that they will push 
very hard whenever they perceive unfair trading practices are being pur-
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sued. One example of this was the Clinton administration's announcement 
that punitive sanctions or penalties would be imposed on nineteen East Asian 
and Westem European countries for dumping subsidized steel in the United 
States. The Clinton administration also annouced that it would impose 
penalties on the EC if it went ahead with its policy that would make 
it harder for American companies to bid on telecommunications and power 
generating contracts in Westem Europe. The Clinton administration has 
also complained about subsidies for the airbus projecto 
I believe that these steps are more of a tactical nature than any-
thing else. I believe that Clinton will pursue very challenging, very tough 
tactics in dea1ing with Westem Europe and East Asia on economic issues, 
but I believe that the Clinton administration's long term strategy in none-
theless to open up the intemational economic system. I do not think Bill 
Clinton is a protectionist. I do not think his advisors are protectionists. 
But they do feel that there are some things that need to be rectified before 
we can move ahead with completion of the GATT negotiations. I think 
that Clinton would like very much to move ahead with the GATT nego-
tiations and complete them in the next couple of months, but he wants 
to see that a couple of problems are addressed before those negotiations 
are fully conc1uded. 
The second issue that Clinton has to address, that is both urgent and 
important, is the former Soviet Union, more specifically Russia. During 
the campaígn I feel that Bill Clinton said ali the right things about Russia. 
He recognizes that is important for the United States to do everything that 
it can to help consolidate the process of democratic and economic reform 
in Russia. He recognizes that the United States will not be able to cut 
defense spending and spend more money, devote more money to domestic 
issues, unless Russia continues down the path that is on. So the United 
States has a vital national interest in making sure that this reform process 
in Russia continue. 
The problem is, there are already indicators, that Bill Clinton will find 
that he does not really have much money to devote to Russia and the 
other republics of the former Soviet Union. During the campaign he gave 
every indication that he would like to spend more money on Russia than 
the Bush administration had been doing. I think Clinton is going to find 
that he simply does not have many resources to draw on. 
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Now, one change that I think we can expect in Clinton's policy is 
a change in the amount of attention he devotes to some of the other repu-
blics of the former Soviet Union. George Bush, in my view, is very much 
oriented towards Moscow, a very Moscow-centric point of view; you might 
recalI that he supported Gorbachov long after it became clear to many 
people that the Soviet Union was about to break up. He supported Yeltsin 
and paid a great deal of attention to Yeltsin in the last year ar so of his 
administration after the Soviet Union had broken up. Now, many leaders 
in the former Soviet Union, they were neglected by the Bush administration. 
I suspect that Bill Clinton, as part of his overalI diplomatic effort to impro-
ve relations with several republics in the former Soviet Union, will take 
steps to spend a Iittle bit more time focusing on the Ukraine, Kazahkstan 
and some of the other republics. 
And the reason for tbis is quite simple, and this brings me to the 
third issue that is both urgent and important, and that is the problem of 
the nuclear arsenal in the former Soviet Union. Important steps have 
already been taken to bring this arsenal under control, and to make sure 
that command and contraI will be preserved in the future. ln the first 
four months of 1992, approximately 6000 tactical nuclear weapons were 
removed from alI of the republics of the former Soviet Union that had 
tactical nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. AlI these weapons 
were moved back to Russia. This is quite an accomplishment, but much 
remains to be done. These tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are 
scheduled for dismantlement, have to be moved into central storage facili-
ties where they can be watched carefully. There are also problems with 
strategic nuclear weapons, as I am sure many of you know, there are still 
four republics, the Ukraine, Kazahkstan, Belorussia and Russia itself that 
have strategic nuclear weapons deployed on their soi!. Approximately 3000 
strategic nuclear weapons are in the Ukraine, Kazahkstan, and Belorrusia, 
and people in Washington are very concerned about them. Now, I expect 
the Clinton administration to move very aggressively in the first year of 
its time in office to try to addrees these various nuclear problems. 
As far as strategic weapons are concerned, I think the priorities are 
very clear. The first step is to make sure that all four of those republics 
ratify the START I Treaty. So far ali of them have, with the notab!e excep-
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tion of the Ukraine, which has promised repcatedly to ratify the START I 
Treaty but has not yel dane so, 
The second step will be to get lhe Ukraine, Kazahkstan and Belorus· 
sia to join the NPT. the Nuclear Non·Proliferation Regime, as non·nuclear 
states, Again, ali three of these republics have repeatedly promised to do 
50, but have not yet done so, 
The next step will be to move very quickly to accelerate the terms 
of the START I Treaty on an accelerated basis. START I Treaty, as many 
of you undoubtedly know, calIs for nuclear forces to be reduced substan· 
tiaIly over a seven year period. The Clinton administration will try to get 
most of these weapons disarmed and disactivated in six months, not seven 
years. They will try to move very quickly with !haL 
Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union still 
have some 29 000 strategie and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in 
various parts of the eountryside, Some 22000 of these weapons are sche· 
duled to bc dismantled in the not too distant future, Unfortunately Russia 
only has the capacity to dismantle abotlt 2000 weapons per year, A simple 
arithmetic tells us that it will take Russia and the other republics ten 01' 
eleven years to dismantle ali of these weapons, if they can only dismantle 
2000 a year, And nobody in Washington ar Western Europe is really happy 
with the idea of 29000 nuclear weapons being stationed in these republics 
[ar the foreseable future. The situation Ihere, is simply too unstable, So 
one of lhe Clinton administration's priorities is to accelerate this disman· 
Ilemenl processo They would like lo complete it in three years, not ten years, 
This will probably mean building an extra dismantlement facility in Russia, 
but that is a price worlh paying, 
So Ihose are lhe Ihree issues Ihat I feel are urgenl and importan!. 
Thc second category of issues are issues that are quite urgent bul some· 
whal less importanl, ai least frolll the standpoint of American national 
security, and hoth of the issues that I would put into this category have 
to do with the former Yugoslavia, 
The mos! important of the two, in my opinion, has to do with making sure 
that the war in Yugoslavia does not spread to Kosovo ar Macedonia, If the war 
was to spread to those republics. Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, could very 
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easily beeome involved in the war. Russia itself eould become involvcd 
in the war. There have been indications in the past few weeks that Russian 
nationalists are deeply concerned about the pressure that is being put on 
their fellow Slavs in Serbia. I think the key, not just for the United States, 
but for Western Europe as a whole, is to foeus every effort on trying to 
keep the war from spreading. One of the lessons Ihat we seem to have 
learned from our inapt handling of the confliet in Bosnia is that it is much 
more efficient and effective to try to prevent eonflicts from breaking out 
than to try to resolve them. Confliet prevention is easier than confliet reso-
lution. And it is important to take steps to keep the war from spreading 
now while it is still possible to do soo I hope that the Clinton administration 
wiII eonsider the possihility of deploying large numhers of American 
troops in Kosovo and Maeedonia, and I hope that Western European 
countries wiII take aggressive steps as well, to keep the war from spreading. 
So far the Clinton administration seems clear1y interested in a diplomatie 
approaeh to the eonfliet. I think as far as Macedonia and Kosovo is concer-
ned that might not be enough. 
The second problem that I would put in the urgent but somewhat less 
important category is Bosnia. And I say it is less important simply becausc 
American, and I feel Western European interests, are not as importantl)' 
engaged there as they are in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. As you 
know, the Clinton administration last week announced its new plan for 
trying to resolve the conflict in Bosnia. I was struck by !wo things in the 
Clinton announcement which was made by Warren Christopher, the Secre-
tary of State, and the first is that it really does not represent a radical 
departure from the policy the United States have been pursuing in the 
past couple of montl,s. The emphasis will stiII be very much on diplomacy, 
the United States does 110t intend to deploy milital'y forces in Bosnia until 
a negotiated settlement has been put into plaee, and the United States will 
not use even Ameriean air power to put more pressure on Serbia. So I 
think by emphasizing diplomacy rather than military deployments or military 
solutions to the eonfliet, the Clinton administration is very mueh eontinuing 
the basic poliey line that has been taken for some time, although it appears 
now that the United States will beeome more actively engaged in the negotia-
tions themselves. 
The second thing that struck me about the Clinton-Christopher plan 
is that it is still vague in many important respeets. Christopher talked 
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aboul putting more pressure on Serbia bul he was nol specific about how 
he would do Ihal. He lalked aboul taking sleps lo make sure Ihal lhe no-fly 
zone is enforced, bul he did nol say whal Ihose sleps would be. He sugges-
led Ihal humanitarian aid should be pushed Ihrough bul he did nol say 
how Ihal would he done. And he said Ihal sleps would be laken lo keep 
lhe conflict from spreading lO Macedonia, but again he did nOI specify 
what those steps would be. So I think there is still many details Ihal have 
to be sorted out and announced before we have a clear idea of what the 
Clinton administration will do on this. 
So far they seem to be taking some steps to become more actively 
lnvolved in what is going on, but they have not yet given us al1 the details 
Ihat we need in order to fully evaluate what they are doing. 
Now, the final category of issues Ihal the Clinlon administration has 
to think about is just what I would call the less urgent and less important. 
One of those, I lhink, is arms conlrol in general. With the notable 
exception of the nuclear arsenais of lhe republics of the former Soviet Union, 
I feel that arms control as far as Europe is concerned will be very much 
on the back burner, will be a low priority, for at least the next year or 
two. Nuclear issues are going lo be dealt with mainly on a bilaleral basis 
between lhe Uniled Slales on lhe one hand, the republics of the former 
Soviel Union on lhe other. The chemical weapons convention, which was 
signed a couple of weeks ago in Paris, is an international effort and will 
be dealt with in thal inlernational or multilateral contexto II is not a purely 
European issue. As far as convenlional forces are concerned, I think what 
we are going to see in the nexl six lo twelve, or perhaps, for lhe neXI year 
or two, are a series of unilateral steps laken by various countries to reduce 
their conventional forces. 
As I said, the United States and Russia have aiready taken unilateral 
steps to reduce their forces above and beyond what Ihey were cal1ed on 
lo do hy lhe CFE treaty. Germany lasl weekend announced that it would 
reduce its forces, and according to the reports that were published in the 
newspapers, Germany plans to reduce the size of its military from 500 000 
to 300000 troops. I suspect Ihat in Eastern and Central Europe in particu-
lar We will see similar kinds of reduclions in the next couple of years. 
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My own view is that it is highly unlikely that we will see a new CFE 
Treaty that outlines new equipment leveis and new troop leveis in the 
next year ar !wo. No one really knows how to organize such a treaty ar 
what the gniding principies should be. It would be much more difficult to put 
into place than the original CFE Treaty, which of course was essentially 
a bloc to bloc negotiation. So as far as European arms contrai is concer-
ned, specifically European arms contrai, I would expect to see comparati-
vely little attention paid to this issues in the next year ar !wO. 
A second and final issue that I think is both less urgent and les8 
important is the whole set of institutional issues that has been so prominent 
in the US-European discussions over the course of the past year ar !wo. 
Now, as you know, there has been a long, agonizing debate in the United 
States and Weslem Europe over what lhe new relationships should be 
between NATO, lhe Westem European Union, and the European Communi-
ty. I believe that this debate has already gane a long way towards re801-
ving itself. If you look aI the communiqués Ihal have been issued by the 
EC, by the Weslem European Union, aI Nato summils in the pasl year ar 
so, you find that they have ali come lo say the same general thing about 
the relationship be!ween the Weslern European Union on the one hand, 
NATO and the EC on the other. I think they have gane as far as they 
can go lo develop broad guidelines for Ihese relationships in the future. 
ln general I Ihink things will be decided On a case by case basis; as we 
have seen in Bosnia, the Weslem European Union has been involved in 
sending some ships to help monilor lhe embargo on the republics of the 
former Yugoslavia, bul Ihese lhings almosl always have to be dealt with 
on a case by case basis. It is just as lhe Persian Gulf and the Gulf 
War was a unique case, Yugoslavia is a unique case, whenever lhe nexl 
issue comes up, that will also have lo be deall with on an «ad hoc» ar 
case by case basis. 
So I do nol expect lo see a whole lot of debate in lhe United States 
ar in Westem European capitais over the question of what the proper 
role of the Weslem European Union and lhe EC should be with respect 
lO NATO. 
One issue that does have to be addressed in the not 100 distant future 
is NATO and the continuing justification for NATO. If you look at what 
the Bush administration said over the course of the past couple of years, 
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in trying lo juslify NATO. you see Ihat the rationale for NATO has chan-
ged dramatically in the past couple of years. Of eourse for a long time 
Ihat was to prevent the Soviet Union. the Warsaw Pact from trying to 
establish hegemony in Western Europe. With the coUapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Bush administration shifted to an argument that said that the 
purpose of Nato and the purpose of having US troops in Europe was to 
make sure that Russia does not try to re-establish hegemony at some point 
in the future. They argued that there was a residual threat that needed to 
be deal! with. They also argued that NATO was needed to promote stability 
in Westem Europe. 
WeU, with the coIlapse of the Russian economy, no one really feels 
that there is even much of a residual military threat to Westem security 
righl now. II is possible thal Russia could rebuild itself aI some point in 
the future, it is possible that Russia could build up its conventional forces. 
hut given that Western Europe and lhe Uniled Slates have a slranger 
eeonomie base to draw on. lhe United States and Westem Europe would 
be able to rebuild its conventional forces faste,' than Russia. We can also 
redeploy more nuclear forces in Europe if that is neeessary. 
As far as NATO pramoting stability in Europe I think NATO has the 
sarne problem lhat the EC has. and as long as people can look at war 
raging in Yugoslavia, it is hard for people to say that NATO has a force 
for promoting stabiliy in Europe. if these kind of eonfliets are going on. 
My point here is that I think in the long run an effort needs to be made by 
the Clinton administration to explain why NATO is needed, to explain 
why an American presence in Europe is needed. and I think this needs 
to be stated explicitly. nol just for the American people but for people in 
Western Europe. 
I think in the foreign policy community, certainly in a group sueh 
as this, I think people understand the main reasons why it is important 
for the Uniled States to be involved in European affairs. I think this needs 
to be explained to the general public. both the United States and the 
Westem Europe, it needs to be dane much more effeetively, and it needs 
to be done by the President of the United Sates. And I hope that will be 
done sooner rather than later. 
With that, let me make just three concluding observations. 
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The first general observation is that the United States has important 
national interests, as I have said, in retaining a military presence in Europe, 
and having an active role to play in Europe. I beiieve that this is a view 
that is widely accepted in the United States, and I also beiieve that is 
widely accepted in Westem Europe. I think there is a consensus across 
the Atlantic that it is important for the United States to play this role, and 
that is why I am quite optimistic that, at Ieast in the immediate future, the 
United States will continue to be an active player in Westem European 
affairs. At Ieast in the near future I do not see the United States packing 
up and going home. The United States does not want to take alI of its 
troops home, and Westem Europe for its part does not want the United 
States to go. Even France wants the United States to stay. 
The second general observation I would iike to make is, I think that 
with the end of the cold war and with the demise of the Soviet threat to 
Westem European security, and with Western Europe no Ionger being 
dependent on lhe United States for its security, a cooperation between the 
United States on the one hand and Western Europe on the other, will be 
more problematic. And the reason for that is that during the cold war we 
had a compelling requirement to cooperate, we had to cooperate on securi· 
ly issues, we had to cooperate on economic issues. If we did not, and we 
fell apart, it would be much easier for the Soviet Union to exercise its 
influence ill Western Europe. So we had to cooperate for a Iong time. Well, 
that compelling requirement to cooperate no Ionger exisls. Alld as a result, 
I think disagreements between the United States and Western Europe will 
probably increase, I think they will probably be sharper in the future than 
they have been in the past, I think they probably will be more pubiic in 
the future than they have been in the past, and I think lhey will be harder 
to resolve in the future than they have been in the pasto I do not think 
they will be impossible to resolve, but I think they will be more difficult. 
Cooperation, I think, will be more problematic in the future, and it is some· 
thing that we are going to have to work at a lot harder if we want to 
preserve i t. 
Now, the third and final general observation I would like to make 
is that I think that leadership will be as important, perhaps more important 
in the future, than it has ever been. ln many cases, I think, this leadership 
will have to come from the United States. We saw in the Persian Gulf, 
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the United States really had to take the lead diplomaticaJly and militarily 
ii the coalition was to have an impact on developments there. My own 
view is that the EC has been totally ineffective at dealing with the conflict 
in Yugoslavia, and again demonstrates that an American leadership role 
is important in many cases. I think though that leadership will be more 
problematic in the future than is has been in the past, in part because 
Europe is no longer dependent on the United States for security, it will 
no longer automatically defer to the United States simply because the 
United Sta!es in the biggest of the Western powers. I think in the future 
if the United States is to play a leading role, and to play this leadership 
role, much will depend on the quality of American ideas. If the United 
States comes up with good ideas, and has constructive ideas for helping to 
lead the Western AlIiance, then I think it is still possible for the United 
States to play that catalytic role. It is still unelear at this point though, 
just how effective the Clinton administration will be at developing these 
ideas and playing this leading role. I think it is entirely possible that the 
Clinton administration could play this role very effectively. I think that 
Bill Clinton is a very smart guy. He has a good background in intemational 
affairs, contrary to what many people think, and I think some of his 
advisers are among the best and the brightest of the foreign policy estabJi-
slunent in the United States. So I think that if the administration pulls 
together and devotes a fair amount of its energies to foreign affairs, we 
could see the United States play this kind of role in the future. It is 
possible though that if Bill Clinton devotes most of his energies to domestic 
affairs, ii his advisers fight amongst themselves, and if the United States 
fails to develop a real strategy for US-European relations, and for US 
foreign policy in general, that we could see drifting American foreign 
policy, drifting US-European relations, and considerable turmoil between 
the United States and Europe. Which of these scenarios we will eventually 
see only time wi1l tell. 
Michael Brown 
110 
